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J!LSTr~f\ D. BI:iJ':TIJ, 
vc,.~ 
Case No. 11096 
JOllil \·!, TURNS!<,, i·.larcl• n, 
~~ Slate Prison 1 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF t:l\.TU:~E OF CASE 
The appellant Chester Brown app2als from a judgment 
of the District Court of Salt Lake County denying his peti-
•lion for releuse by writ of habeas corpus with respect to 
his commitment in Case No. 7231 in the District Court of 
10.'eber County and his cormnitment in Case No. 19678 in the 
'District Court of Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\\IER COURT 
On March 11, 1963, Chc:ster DroHn pleaded guilty to 
ch" cTirnc of issuing a clwc:k ag0inst insufficient funds before 
.th<? llonc>L~abJc ParJcy E. Nc•rselh in U1C Scc:und ,"Judicial Dis-
1:ict Coutt, St0tc of UL,1h. On Mcty 13, 1963, he was sentenced 
I 
i 
IJ,,, h C\'l'.f,1.1l led tu lh~: l1U1li :;t;1tc Prison. While on p0role 
of 0,1 cind lc11:ce:ny before the Honorable Mctrcellus K. Snow in 
I -
dlic Di strict Court of the Third Judicial District and was 
i 2'1ii ct•ced to be convni tted to the Utah State Prison on April 
28, 1966. 
On Februacy 7, 19G7, Mr. Brown filed a petition for 
1'!Ii t of habeas corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake 
Cotrnty. The petition alleged that Mr. Brown was without 
counsel because the court did not fully advise him of his 
right to counsel in the 1963 case, and it alleged that he 
I involuntarily entered a plea of guilty in the 1966 case. 
i 
On November 2, 19G7, a hearing on the writ was held 
before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft in the District Court 
of Solt Lake County. 
On November 2, 1967, Judge Croft entered his order 
i 
denying p2ti tion for writ of habeas corpus with respect to 
j both co:nmj_ tmen ts. The court found that in the 1963 case 
Hr. BrovJn ~1as given adequate notice of his right to counsel, 
I 
'did understandingly waive that right, and was correctly 
I lciJ cJ of the consequences of his pleu. The court also found 
1 t\v1t Mc. Brown voluntciri ly entered a plea of guilty in the 
-2-
/\1>1,=·J J cint :;~ckco rcvc r ~,,i J Clf th(_: c1cnio 1 of th•o pc ti-· 
liOJl f ui:· vir_ :it (! hahcc1:; CC>r lJUS l_;y lhr: D:Lslrict Court of 
Scilt L.cl]J' Couril 1:1ith respect to b'Jl- xwictions. 
STATEl11FJJT OF Flier 
Chesler Drown, a prisoner at the Utah State Prison, 
Draper, Utah, filed a petj i ion fo1~ a ·writ of habeas corpus 
in the District Court of Salt Lak•'" County. The petition 
attacked the validity c£ his i111pd_sonrnent on two convictions. 
As to the first conviction, the complaint alleged 
that during proceedings in the District Court of Weber 
County #7231 at which petitjoner pleaded guilty, he was with-
out aid of cou l because he had been improperly advised 
~ his right b Junsel. 
At the he '_ng on the complaint, the transcript of 
lhe proceeding~, n Case 7231 were introduced into evidence 
1/ 
as Exhibit P-2 (R. 4): In Case 7231 appellant was charged 
11ith issuing a check against insufficient funds. Arraignment 
lids on ,July 11, 1963 before ~Jl'"\Je Norseth. At this time, 
the court inform peti tionc·L- l h8t the charge carried with 
it a peni tentii1r) 'ntcnce <:•11 ~ informed him that he was en-
- (1) The transcLi r of Case 7231 onc1 Case 19678 will be re-
ferred to ro " " The lri.mscript of the hearing on the 
will will be n_·fcrred to as "R". 
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Ii J I'' 1-,, 1 • 1': c'11lcxl by an uUornoy, but the court 
:1• ;;' L.c-'l'ik'Y for h.hn jf he couldn't afford one. (T. 2). 
Till' l',-~lj ti0;1cr indicated that he waived the attorney and 
then p1c0clod guilty (T. 2). The court on March 18, 1967, 
nol ~ .. >\.'in0 \\1hetl1er there was anything wrong mentally 
11ilh the petitioner sent him to the State Mental Hospital 
for obsecvc:ition (T. 3). Judge Norseth stated that the 
reporC. from the State Mental Hospital showed that petitioner 
1·1as distL1:-1_,2d, but not insane (T. 4). On May 13, 1963, 
peti Uon2r was sentenced to the State Penitentiary (T. 6). 
At trial in this case on d{rect examination relating 
to Case 7231, appellant stated that if he had had money 
he wou1d hu_ve liked an attorney, but since he did not, he 
fell he might a; well plead guilty and get it over with 
(R, 8). Appellant indicated that he pleaded guilty because 
off:icers had threatened to prosecute him as an habitual 
criminal if he didn't plead guilty (R. 8). He testified 
· th;:it he knew there was no use contacting an cl::torney because 
he dic1 not have cmy money to pay him (R. 9). 
Appellant estifiec1 that.. .1e did not understand that 
he WciS waiving his right to an attorney though he couldn't 
i1ffo1-c1 one (R. 10). Appellant indicated the court had not 
-4-
i 1'.J j n cou ,- L o 
end 1934 (!\. 28). App2Jlcmt stalcc.cl th;-it the two officers 
1:110 hc.td thrca tcned to have hi 111 yros•:cutE.d ~ c• Cl,._") a h3bitual 
cri1iiinal H:::re pJain cJc,U1C'c, policcs'.'1c·n and one was named 
:trvcns (E. 30). He a1:=:~' indicated thr officers had not 
th:·ec:1lenco him physically, but he fc,:11 ed they rnight harm 
hir:1 because' they hc1d u reputatior. of working fellows over. 
l'ppclJ<int indicated it WcJS a casti' l <:icquuintance who had 
loJd him of this repulc1L:i on but he co'Jld not recall any 
n°1111cs (I\. 31). He also staled that counsel durin;i- the 1942 
c111'1 J93·1 c<:1ses \·:ct-e cou:·t appointr·cl (R. 32), a~1d he knew 
1:1H· JCJ,J? cci~~c the cc,ud. lnd C1clvisccl h:irn tll.::it it would 
-5-
l i, 1 1_ !1i1:, :ii lh' 1:.111lcd :i1,1il1iJe jn 19(,3 
, . l' · ~ : ' i ·' L 1111' l i I: of lii.s plc,~t in 1963 hl' hi1d for--
L I \ '~ i 11..J,i b~'C'n told hj1,1 :in 1942 (R. 44). Appellant 
lr,<1 k1:; l'~•. in l~lcd, but that it was the failure of 
co1y: l- to indicci te tli<d.: counsol 1·1ould be provided by 
cc1'.ll_ t ll 1C1 i s:toppcd him frorn stating his desires 
l\S to tho second conviction for grand larceny and 
r:·'l>c1y, th::: complaint alleged that in Case 19678, District 
Ccilli:t o:[ S<:ilt LC11<:e County, on April 28, 1966, petitioner 
:in1'~>ln11ic:•:ily entered a plea of guilty. 
At the hc0ring on the compluint the transcript of 
the i11 occcc:ciir19s in Case 196 78 were introduced into ari-
cle::nc:E: c:is Exhibits P·-4 (R. 5). In Case 19678 upon arraign· 
rncnt on Mcicch 28, 1966, appellant entered a plea of not 
guilty to charge~ of robbery and grand larceny and also 
as::"'i·t(.J in.sanity. On !1pril 19, 1966, a sanity hearing 
\·'cJ.c; liclcl b fore .1uc10c Mcffccllus K. Sno1v and appellant was 
_-j U' l_r~J .~ :. :1 • Oll ApdJ 28, 1966, the elate set for trial, 
<1p11r:JJ:111l 1-1dlJdt0i'f his plea of not guilty to the grand 
J,,rc:criy ch<.tr9e cincl enlcrcd a pleo of guilty and the 
-6-
'''J \'lh'~n he cl1c:1Ct1f.cl his plea 
([;. 1'.J). Appellant l c , the t he had vJ<mtecl a jury 
tr:icJl, but had cntc1cd ' . _c::i er guilty bc:·cause of threats 
by pc.Jlicc oLC-icers to hc1ve an hai :i.tuul criminal charge 
added lo Ui2 other cl1r1i-ges (R. JC 17). Arpellant stated 
that he hcid told rk. J:ir,·:i J;itsur,~'CJCl he would like a jury 
trial (H. 17), 
that by cl 1cin0:ing h Le- plc::i to gu: J ty on thc:o grand larceny 
clv:wgc he would be sc,nl. to the Utah State Pcni tentiary 
rn. 40 .. 12). 
Upon direct cxcuninotjon: oppcJl2111t te::;lified that 
h,, plcoclc-cl guilty to g1·c-1nci Jan~,,ny rccithci_· lhun get charged 
ace; cin l!c1bilniJ criminc:;l (R. 4'1- ~'1). He inc1icateJ that he 
dicl nut t111JC'1·~;l,-11i:l C\'c'1-ytl1:i11,;i Judc_ic .SnOh' lo1c1 him (R. 45). 
lie stCll~:d lh<1t h:is ccluczdion cnclcd in the eighth grade 
(IL I)~;). !le t<'stif:ied that he hi:ld told l'-11.-. O'Connell, 
-7-
j I l<<;tif:i.cJ th;_1l he .represented appellant 
cc:, Uk,t ;c· L the ti111c o{ the final plea tl1cre were discus-
;, i c '"'· in J'u:.\12 Sno\.'' s chcJHUJ(TS bchJecn himself, the District 
/',tlt. ·, 1ey\ an::.1 tl1e court (R. 48). J'!Jr. O'Conncll stated at 
tl1[ :- i i ,,_:" Lh,: .::ipp2llant was sitting in the jury box and was 
no:. c::scnt cl.uring the discussion (R. 49). Mr. O'Connell 
inc~_;( c..·Lccl_ ll1c•t t11e State vJonted to procc~d v.rit11 trial, but 
the cou.c c \'.'.'3S not ready for trial and felt a negotiated plea 
1·.'.>111 ~ }12 cm cciuitDble result (R. 49--50). Mr. O'Connell 
stc:: J Uic;t clfter the negotiations he came out and toJd 
app2Jlant he had got a deal and couJd plead guilty to grand 
lcircciJY (R, 50). 
On c.Toss··cxarninaU.on, Mr. O'Connell stated he might 
liC!v~· toJd 21p;::icllimt how thc various parties at the negotia-
tjc,n:::; l!i:td fe]l about the case (R. 52). 
Mc. 0'Corme11 slated that he did not think Judge 
ci:.:kr cl fcJJ· c:1 jucy t.ric.d.. Mr. O'Connell indicated that no 
-8-
Clr:J,dn~;l hjn (!<. 5?.), 
Mc. C:::cuJcl Gu1ic_J; y, fei,111cr1y of Ir::gal Defend'.::r's offir::E 
lo be fiJccl in the case because of infoniation he hacJ re-
cc-ivcd cc;ncen1:in9 uf-Ji':_:11ant's condition (R. 55--56). Mr. 
Gundry lestif:iPcl th21t he wos present at the mental hearing 
held before Judge Sn8\·J rn., 5 6) • Mr. Gundry stated the 
doctors stcJted that Mr. Bro\·m hF1d a sociopachic disorder 
but v.'aS not psychotic (R. 56~57). Vir. Gundry testified 
that the cJoclors statcJ that TJr. Brown's problc1c1s stcrrmed 
from addict ion to bar bi tun1 tes and from too n1cmy years of 
irnpd_coorITT1ent Oz. 57). Upon cross--cxamination, J\lr. Gundry 
indicated he wus pn:·sc:nt only cl the hearing and not at thE 
interview between the psychiatrists and Mr. Dro\·m (R. 58). 
The Distcict Coui~t found the app2llant was not entit: 
to the writ of ha1x;LJ.s corpus on either conviction. 
POINT I 
'J'lll; J lll:Jl:f\ COllJ\'l' Ll~l~l:D JN CONCI ,llli:J Nl~ TllAT J\PPCL-
L!\N'J' V( ll ,l/1 N/'.l\I l ,y J\f\l U JN n~l ,LJ Gf<Nfl ,y \\11\IVED HIS 
-9--
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1;:,· '1' '11) '('cl,;:,1,1, h 1 ,'i'l1"lcl1',!l !JI, 11:1:; NOi' I!H"Of:i]J:n 
'" 1:1·, J,:1, ';,' '1,1 l\111!'.'l'· /\J'l'(lJNTJ,ll COUN:-;1:L. 
372 U,S, 335 (1963), held 
r 1joy ri~1ht of coun,"< J fOL' hi:::; defense is obligatory on 
tL· c_, l c:tc:-c~ by virtue of the F'ow:'tE::cnth Amendment, and that 
:,1.1.i9l11t clcfcnc10nt in a criminal prosecution in a state 
cc·c'' l hc,c, the right to have coun:c-.cl appointed for him. 
The r:igi1t to counsel cc:in be 1daivcd, but "It has 
bcrJ 1 ~,:jnlc;:1 out that 'courts must indulge every reasonable 
p1·est1;1ption agcd.nst waiver' of fundamental constitutional 
ri~Jit:·~ and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss 
cf fonclcr·.cntal rights'." ,John:c-:a::~·" Zci;:~:o-:_~,~ 304 U.S. 458, 
jrc e:1ppli ri1bJ (~ to a.sscr tccl wc:ti v<::TS of the right to counsel 
'
1 1p1 et, cd 51(,: "The record rnust sho\;J or there must be an 
-10-· 
i ( 'i I 1 • 1 \ / 1 J I { ) } ;,j JIJ,1'' 
(l r f ( I I 
:.o ,c;;il:Ls.Cy the~ requ:i 1 er:: ,nt thot a c onfc;;s:i.on b2 voluntary 
"In orclc·r fully lo cippr ise c:: pc:r son intccro~iJ.tE.d 
of th~ c;:tc,d of hi.c; rights : 1dH- this 51y51tcr11 
thC'11 1 _it is_necc~ s;- 1·y to \!i:l .. 1 h}rn ,r1'Jt cmly_ th~t 
_hE:' }'w :;. U 12 .r:iCJh t tu .co:15 l1l t \. i th c:n c:ttor! 12y_ , _ _Eu_!': 
aJse> th. :if h-:= :i:> :incJiqr•(1t '' la\,'yc1: \.·jJJ be a1~-. 
pci:i.ntrc 1 'Ln rr·:Jr·c< ·· :11. hi111. ·, t:·1out thi~> c:1dcl:Ltional 
\·:cffnirKJ l tJic CIOJ1t[)lJi lion o.\ "- h:c' ri9ht to consult 
with cou!1sel \»'ouJd ofi.en h.c· un:1ec:c.tood as wcanin;J 
only thc:1t h0 can co11su.lt '· 'i: 11 a le:1wyc::r :i.f. he has 
0112 O!'.' has tl1e func':: to obt- jn one', " (Emphasis 
aclc1ed) 
Al though Viiran:Ja j s not con~coJ ling as to the scope 
of tl1r~ S:ixl:.h Awe11drnc11t 1 the stat€ ,1""'nts 2re persuasive indi-
Ciltio112 of tllc sla.ndard of lKOccciurcil sufegl1ccu-d.s required 
-·] l -· 
(?,':J \',?cl 921 (J968), he:lc1 lhat the failure of the.! 
·.I cc' :i 11fon1 cic~fc ncli:1nt of his rjght to coucl-·apµointcd 
l c1jc1 11c::L deny ck:fc:ndc:int rds r:ight lo counsel undet .. 
::: . .)<~1 J,,. ncl .:.·nt to U1c Constitut:ion. The court based 
4J5 P.2d 919 (1968), a case involving a 
~ir .·,. l: cc 1"l::itutional right than the .!'!~~.<?l:~:n .. v~.--'E:-~t;i:'._CE_ 
'c Ut ~~1 v. \r~~1rkrr;c:22' supra i involved the: issue of whc·-
'' c1ci,.:r1clant mu.st be:: \.,rorncd of his right to court-·ap-· 
r· i J ; Ii J.1 · r1c1nc11t to the Fccl(~ra J Cons ti tut ion. The court 
lcl l Ji:,I, 11 ,_c] 01i p1:c· nir0nrlu shJndards, (an erroneous 
1.11. fc:1ct~-.) clcfrncL--mt's conf(·o,sion di.d not vio-
Li': 1 i._ 1 1iL~; unc1cr th F:ifth l\rncnclr11cnt although he wr.s 
-1?--
iJt told by police officers of his right to court-appointed 
;ounsel. The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
rith w'.-1ich the Nielsen case was involved is retroactive. 
;ideon v. Wa~·!wright, supra; Doughty v. Maxwell, supra. 
~herefore, we urge the court to overrule Nielsen v. Turner, 
is it is based upon a case involving a different constitu-
tional right with standards which do not apply retroactively, 
ind is directly in conflict with federal decisions in this 
State. 
In Pharris v. State, 424 P.2d 390 (Ida. 1967) 7 the 
Idaho Supreme Court in an appeal from a denial of a writ 
of habeas corpus held the appellant who had been told of 
his right to counsel and asked if he wanted a lawyer but 
had not been told of his right to court-appointed counsel 
if he was indigent did not intelligently waive counsel. 
The court set out the standard to be followed at 394, stat-
ing: 
"Particularly on an arrangement as concerns the 
right to counsel, an accused must be advised of 
his right to counsel and his right to have coun-
sel appointed at public expense if indigent,for 
under our procedure the court must, before pro-
ceeding further, determine whether the accused 
desires counsel, and if he does not desire coun-
sel whether in truth and in fact as developed, as 
developed by the record at that time, he has 
knowledge of his rights and then has knowingly 
and intelligently waived them." (Emphasis added) 
-13-
The court further held that the fact in a previous 
:ase in which appellant was the defendant he had been warned 
L1at he had a right to court-appointed counsel did not warrant 
a finding that he had intelligently waived counsel in the 
case before the court. 
The facts in the Pharris case are very similar to this 
case. In 1942 and 1934 appellant had received court-appointed 
counsel. In both the Pharris case and this case the appel-
lants were not told of their right to court-appointed counsel 
but in the past had received or were told of court-appointed 
counsel. In several other cases besides Pharris supra, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that indigent defendants did 
not waive their right to counsel because they were not told 
of their right to court-appointed counsel, although they 
were present when others were told of this right or were told 
of this right outside of court. 
In Bement v. State, 422 P.2d 55 (Ida. 1966), defendant 
was present when others accused along with defendant were 
. told of right to court-appointed counsel. In Abercrombie v. 
State, supra, the prosecuting attorney had told defendant -
that when he got to district court an attorney would be ap-
pointed. In these cases as in Pharris supra, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held the circumstances mentioned did not justif~ 
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a finding of \ i_ ver of counsel under federal constitutional 
standards for \vaiver of counsel. 
In Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, the Supreme Court of 
ilie United States in discussing the Constitutional standards 
for waiver of counsel stated at p. 464: 
"The determination of whether there has been an 
intelligent waiver of right to counsel must de-
pend, in each case, upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including 
the background, experience, and conduct of the 
accused." 
The background, experiences and conduct of the appel-
lant show that appellant has had an eighth grade education, 
and has spent 34 of his 55 years in jail which has affected 
his mental condition (R. 5). Appellant was taking barbi-
turates and wine for a long period of time including the 
~riod of time in jail before entering his plea (R. 11-12). 
Appellant was sent to the State Mental Hospital because the 
judge did not know whether or not he was sane. 
These facts about appellant indicate he has a diffi-
cult time understanding matters. The transcript of the pro-
ceedings in Case 7231 shows appellant did not fully under-
stand the proceedings. For example, appellant answered 
1'guilty" when asked if he wanted a lawyer (T. 2). Appellant's 
testimony during the hearing on the petition further demon-
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strates thc:it he did not understand his right to court-
appointed counsel (R. 10, 11, 44). Upon the basis of these 
factors, appellant contends that the fact that he received 
I 
court-appointed counsel some twenty years earlier cannot 
justify the conclusion that appellant knew of his right to 
court-appointed counsel although not told of this right by 
the judge. 
other factors also affected appellant's decision to 
~ive his right to counsel. Appellant testified that he 
was threatened by officers that he would be prosecuted as 
an habitual criminal if he did not plead guilty (R. 8). 
This fear played a part in appellant's decision to waive 
counsel and "a rejection of federal constitutional moti-
vated by fear cannot ••• constitute an intelligent 
waiver.~' Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 164 ( 195 7). 
The judge did not inform appellant of the nature of the 
charge against him nor did he inquire as to whether there 
was a factual basis for appellant's guilty plea. Under 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a court 
cannot accept a guilty plea without "• •• determining that 
the plea is made voluntarily with an understanding of the 
nature of the charge" and, " ••• without making such in-
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quiry 0s nuy SCltisfy it that there is factual basis for the 
plc:i." The United States Supreme Court has stated: "To 
~ valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of 
the nature of the charges; the statutory offenses included 
within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, 
, •• " Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 u.s. 708, 724 (1947). 
Though not binding upon state criminal proceedings, Rule 
11 was promulgated to insure a defendant's understanding 
of the proceedings before entering a plea of guilty. This 
.lack of communication between appellant and the court 
added to appellant's confusion at the time he stated he 
waived counsel and entered his guilty plea. 
The threats by police officers, appellant's mental 
makeup, and the fact that the judge did not tell appellant 
of his right to court-appointed counsel nor the nature of 
the charge were the decisive factors in appellant's decision 
to waive counsel and plead guilty. It is contended that 
appellant has met his burden of proof as stated in Syddal v. 
~ner, No. 10950, January 30, 1968, in showing that his 
waiver of counsel was not "(v)oluntary and intelligently" 
made under the standards of the Sixth Amendment. 
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POINT II 
THE LOl:JER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SECTION 
77-24-G' UTAH com: ANN<YI'ATED 1953, DOES N<YI' REQUIRE 
THE JV '.: TO STATE TO A DEFENDANT THE MAXIMUl1 SEN-
TENCE · .. ICH CAN BE IMPOSED BEFORE ACCEPTING A 
GUILTY PLEA. 
In Case 7231 appellant was told by the judge that 
a guilty plea carried vi th it a penitentiary sentence but 
was not told the maximum sentence which could be imposed 
upon a plea of guilty. Appellant contends that Section 
77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires that a defen-
dant be told of the maximum penalty that can be imposed be-
fore the court can accept a guilty plea. 
Section 77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states: 
"Where the defendant is not represented by counsel, 
the court shall not accept a plea of guilty until 
it shall have explained to the defendant the con-
sequences of such a plea." 
The United States Supreme Court has previously set 
out approximately the same rule as u.c.A. 77-24-G when it 
stated: 
"Out of just consideration for persons accused of 
crimes, courts are careful that a plea of guilty 
shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after 
proper advice and with full understanding of the 
consequ~nces." !'~c:-l1ibroda v. United States, 368 · 
U.S. 487, 493 (19G2) • 
In Harper v. . ited States, 368 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1966), 
the court was faced with the issue as to scope of "conse-
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quences" uncler the Supreme Court rule in Machibroda v. 
United State~ supra. The court stated at 53-54: 
--~------
"Before accepting a plea of guilty the court should 
either advise the defendant or be certain that de-
fendant has been advised of the corsequences of 
the plea of guilty. 
One of the consequences, with respect to which 
defendant should be advised is the maximum sen-
tence which may be imposed on a plea of guilty . 
• • • " (Emphasis added) 
This court interpreted u.c.A. 77-24-6 in State v. 
Banford 7 13 Utah 2d 63, 36 P.2d 473 (1962). The court held 
that the failure of the judge to inform defendant that the 
plea of guilty carried with it a penitentiary sentence was 
one of the consequences that defendant must be advised of 
under u.c.A. 77-24-6. The court cited Krolage v. People, 
224 79 N.E. 470 (1906) as authority for its decision. In 
Krolage v. People, supra, the defendant was told by the judge 
that he would receive a penitentiary sentence, but not the 
length of time of the ~ntence. The court held that the 
explanation of the judge to the defendant that a guilty 
plea carried a penitentiary sentence was not the only conse-
quence that need be explained, but that the length of time 
defendant might be sentenced also must be explained. The 
lower court misread State v. Banford, supra, and the legisla-
tive intent behind U.C.A. 77-24-6 by holding that the trial 
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judge need only inform a defendant that a guilty plea 
carries a penitentiary sentence. The length of the sentence 
upan a plea of guilty is of vital concern to a defendant 
faced with a crimbal charge. 
The lower court stated in its order that it would have 
been well that in strict compliance with law for the judge 
to in£onn appellant of the maximum sentence, but that appel-
lant probably knew of the sentence because he had previously 
served sentences on similar charges. In People v. Washington, 
5 Ill. 2d 58, 124 N.E. 890, 892 (1955), a case cited in State 
v. Banford, supra, the court stated: 
"The very purpose of Rule 27A (providing that 
judge must tell defendant consequences of guilty 
plea) is to provide a form of procedure eliminat-
ing any doubt that a plea of guilty was made with 
£ull knowledge and understanding and to avoid the 
method of procedure where a defendant's knowledge 
and understanding were held to rest solely on 
implications arising from the common law record. 
To this end the rule has carefully spelled out 
the information which must be conveyed to a defen-
dant to give him full knowledge of the charge 
against him, and leaves little if any, room for 
indulgence in presumptions." 
Section 76-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states that the 
court shall explain the consequences of a guilty plea to a 
defendant but makes no mention of presumed knowledge by the 
defendant. There is no indication in the proceedings in 
Case 7231 of such knowledge by appellant. Reversal is 
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POINT III 
THE LO\vER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPElr-
LANT INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO JURY 
' TRIAL AND CONSEQUENTLY ENTERED A VOLUNTARY PLEA 
OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF GRAND LARCENY IN 1966. 
There is an increasing awareness by courts in general 
:hat if injustice is to be avoided courts must be extremely 
:areful when accepting pleas of guilty to inquire into the 
i:isis of the plea and the circumstances surrounding the 
:ases. In .Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) 
~he Supreme Court stated at 493: "A guilty plea if induced 
;y promises or threats which deprive it of character of an 
1oluntary act, is void." The court also stated at 493, 
~oting from Kercherral v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 
1926): "Out of just consideration for persons accused of 
:rime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not · 
~ accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and 
un understanding of the consequences." 
We contend that the Judge in Case No. 19678 faced 
ith appellant whose mental abilities were clearly below 
~rrnal and faced with the circumstances of the case, did not 
lke sufficient inquiry into the basis and reason for appel-
int' s plea of guilty to insure its voluntariness. 
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Appellant is a man who has an eighth grade education; 
who previous to trial was taking barbiturates and wine; who 
was given a sanity heal'.'ing in the case because of doubts of 
his mental ability; who has spent nearly all of his adult 
life in prison, all of which had affected his mental pro-
cesses (R. 57). He was threatened by police officers that 
he would be prosecuted as an habitual criminal if he did not 
plead guilty to grand larceny (R. 16); and was sitting in the 
jury box while the prosecuting attorney, the judge and his 
attorney were discussing his case, after which his attorney 
told him he could plead guilty to grand larceny and get the 
robbery charge dismissed (R. 49, 50). Because of these 
factors affecting appellant's mental abilities and because 
of the fact he was nearby when a discussion about his case 
was held between the judge, prosecuting attorney, and de-
fense counsel, it seems apparent appellant was influenced 
when defense counsel came out of the discussions and said 
to appellar:it, "we got a deal." (R. 50). The fact that 
appellant knew the judge was involved when it was decided 
that appellant could plead guilty to grand larceny and have 
the robbery charge dropped, may have caused appellant to 
plead guilty to the grand larceny charge, but the judge 
made no inquiry into the reasons for appellant's change of 
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µle,=i to 0ui1t y. lie made no inquiry as to whether threats 
cir µrornises had induced appellant to change his plea. 
The American Bar Association project on Minimum 
Stcu.Jards of Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, Sec. 3.3, 
p. 71, 73, points out that the trial judge should not parti-
cipate in pleas discussions. The article states as follows: 
"There are a number of valid reasons for keeping 
a trial judge out of plea discussions including 
the following: (1) judicial participation in the 
discussions can create the impression in the mind 
of the defendant that he would not receive a fair 
trial were he to go to trial before this judge; 
(2) judicial participation makes it difficult for 
a judge objectively to determine the voluntariness 
of the plea when it is offered; (3) judicial parti-
cipation to the extent of promising a certain sen-
tence is inconsistent with the theory behind the 
case of the presentence investigation report (none 
was used here) and (4) the thought of not going 
with the disposition apparently desired by the 
judge may seem so great to the defendant that he 
will be induced to plead guilty. Comment, 32 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 167, 180-183 (1964). Note 112 Pa. L. 
Rev. 865, 891-892 (1964). Note 55 Colum. L. Rev. 
366, 371 (1955)." 
The validity of reasons 1 and 4 are clearly demon-
strated by Case 19678 in which appellant's lack of education 
and mental problems make clear the danger of possible in-
fluence on a defendant's plea by a judge who participated 
in plea discussions. In fact, in Case 19678 defense counsel 
may have told appellant that the judge was in favor of 
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droppin<J the robbery charge upon a guilty plea to the grand 
larceny charge (H. 52). Knowing how the judge felt about 
the case could have influenced the same manner as if appel-
lant hctd dealt directly with the judge on plea negotiations. 
In United Sta,!:.es v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. 
N. Y. 1966), the court held that a promise by the judge that 
defendant would not receive more than ten years if he 
pleaded gui~ty rendered the guilty plea involuntary. The 
court stated at 253: 
"The issue (voluntariness of guilty pleas) does 
not lend itself to precise mathematical deter-
mination; its resolution is one of fact which 
involves an evaluation of psychological factors 
and elements that may be reasonably calculated 
to influence the human mind." 
In Gilligan, supra, the judge dealt directly with the 
defendant while in Case 19678 appellant knew of the judge's 
involvement in the plea discussions while he waited in the 
jury box. To insure that appellant's guilty plea was not 
based on a belief that the court wanted a guilty plea from 
him, the judge should have inquired into the reasons for 
appellant's guilty plea to determine its voll...mtariness. 
Such an inquiry would have made certain that the judge's 
role in the plea discussions was not the reason for appel-
lant's guilty plea. 
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f\pp"'lle:mt' s tcst:lmony was that he wanted a jury trial 
.!. 17) and. his rncntality was suspect. It is submitted 
tkil the 101ver court erred in finding that appellant did 
enter his plea of guilty voluntarily and erred in finding 
the judge made sufficient inquiry as to the voluntariness 
0f the guilty plea to insure that appellant made the plea 
0:1 his own volition. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the record in Case 7231 that appel-
lant did not waive his right to counsel under Sixth Amendment 
standards and his plea of guilty was accepted in violation 
of Section 77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The record 
also shows that appellant's plea was not voluntarily entered 
in Case 19678. 
It is therefore submitted that this court should re-
verse the decision of the lower court and grant appellant's 
~tition for writ of habeas corpus. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Salt Lake County Bar 
Legal Services, Inc. 
431 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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